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Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am is a text commonly noted for revolving preliminarily 
around concepts of animal consciousness and the appreciation of animal welfare and 
preservation, a call to shake off antique views of humanity’s self-created superiority in the 
zoological topography of the world. On top of these analyses, it is also important to 
acknowledge that Derrida uses concepts of the human self and psyche to pursue his argument, 
cleverly planting the narratorial lens of the text upon his own perspective—the human—while 
the gaze of his cat remains an external factor, something other to himself; something other, in 
fact, to all humanity. In this sense, his text in many places overlaps with theories presented by 
Lacan, as he too challenged older beliefs regarding the human self via in-depth analyses of the 
individual and its place in regard to other individuals and external influences. However, the 
more modern Derrida takes us further by introducing the concept of the animal other to this 
exploration. The two passages which I will explore as an introduction to this essay—a study of 
overcoming the barriers of the self—show how Derrida’s approach intertwines with Lacan’s 
philosophy more closely than one may expect, whilst also shifting the offered perspective in a 
new direction as an expansion of the realm of psychoanalytical study. This in turn reveals a 
description of the self in conversation between the two: a startling and explosive breach of the 
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constructed self as an epiphany which leaves the subject exposed to according alteration. After 
this comparison, I will introduce different philosophical and mythological examples from 
throughout history in order to further explore human understanding of the malleable psyche 
and the means by which we can overcome its boundaries, including Nietzsche’s implications 
toward the artistic self (in relation to Dionysian revelry) in The Birth of Tragedy. 
The first passage to be explored, taken from Lacan’s ‘The Mirror Stage as formative of 
the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience’, first delivered in 1949, describes 
the primary impact of the self-regarding or realising itself for the first time. This self-realisation 
in children presents the I as ‘a primordial form’, a ‘jubilant assumption of [the subject’s] 
specular image by the child at the infans stage’.1 Lacan also describes the self-confrontation as 
a ‘symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated’, relating to the realm in which the 
psychological construction and interpretation of the external world—the realm of the 
imaginary—must take place: that of the symbolic (Lacan, Mirror Stage, p. 62). The subject 
necessarily views itself within this realm—that of spoken or written language, imagery and any 
type of symbolism which one could label—as it is within it that the subject formulates 
assumptions or ideals about itself in what Lacan describes as a ‘fictional direction’ (Lacan, 
Mirror Stage, p. 62). In a term more immediately to the impression of self-realisation, this acts 
as a ‘coming-into-being’, but also a coming into self-resolution, an imaginary-led concept of 
what the subject is from its own analysis and hypotheticalities (Lacan, Mirror Stage, p. 62). It 
is from the two realms of imaginary and symbolic in conversation that ‘the subject anticipates 
in a mirage the maturation of his power’, and an ideology regarding the stubborn construction 
of the self by the self is created (Lacan, Mirror Stage, p. 62). Lacan briefly highlights from this 
externality of influence the gestalt, or the concept of how an individual is seen through 
 
1 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic 
experience’, in Ecrits: A Selection, trans. by A. Sheridan (London: Routledge, repr. 1993), pp. 61–78 (p. 62). 
Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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symbolic and imaginary assumptions as different to its original components. This gestalt acts 
as a symbolic representation of ‘the mental permanence of the I’, that which keeps the self from 
dissolving into obscurity, as well as something which ‘prefigures its alienating destination’ 
(Lacan, Mirror Stage, p. 62). Lacan thus describes an imagined permanence and direction, a 
purpose given to something without purpose, a tool utilised to keep the self from failing entirely 
in the physical world. In short, the subject uses the aforementioned assumptions to construct a 
permanent I, whilst also haunting it with ‘the phantoms’ of future possibilities and assumptions 
(Lacan, Mirror Stage, p. 62). All this comes from a juvenile observation within the realms of 
symbolic and imaginary, a confrontation of the self with the self.  
Derrida confronts an idea very similar to that which we descried from the above passage 
as a key theme in The Animal That Therefore I Am, as is acutely described in the chosen 
passage. Starting with a description of the ‘bottomless gaze’ of ‘the other’, Derrida argues that 
‘the gaze called animal offers to [our] sight the abyssal limit of the human’; in other words, 
reminding us of everything we are not, the antithesis to the self.2 This takes us to the very limit 
of what language—or the symbolic—can describe, ‘the bordercrossing from which vantage 
man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes 
he gives himself’ (Derrida, p. 381). This description resonates heavily with concepts introduced 
by Lacan in the prior passage, in particular the concept of man naming himself symbolically 
and the previous construction and maintenance of the self through the imaginary: the border at 
which self-consideration is brought to light. What is different, however, is the method by which 
this enlightenment of self is achieved (and there are different aftershock effects as a result of 
the initial impact, too); the animal gaze, the gaze of the complete other, is what causes this 
confrontation, rather than the reflection of the self on to the self. The confrontation is the 
 
2 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, Critical Inquiry, 28 (2002), 369–418 
(p. 381). Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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opposite of internal, and the impact reflects theories from Lacan regarding the realm of the 
real, or of unutterable truth. This lies beyond the realm of the symbolic, as it cannot be accessed 
in any perceptive way, and to Derrida, it can be reached through the gaze of the animal other: 
‘in these moments of nakedness, under the gaze of the animal, everything can happen to me, I 
am like a child ready for the apocalypse…that is to say the ultimate and first event of the end, 
the unveiling and the verdict’ (Derrida, p. 381). The subject becomes nude, primordial; under 
the gaze of the animal other, they again become plastic, as they were before Lacan’s mirror 
stage. The truth is unveiled, but only in an ‘instant of extreme passion’ which quickly passes, 
a flash of sublime (Derrida, p. 381). This encounter of the self should not be reduced to simply 
being looked upon by an animal, but instead as a sudden realisation of the gaze of an utterly 
different other, a gaze of life from a perspective even further detached from the subject than 
simply that of another human. It is more an instant of realisation than a mundane happening.  
This flash of exposure to the real (to Lacan, accessed in moments of dreaming) is 
described by Lacan as a confrontation with ‘Medusa’s head’: a ‘revelation of…something 
which properly speaking is unnameable’. This petrifying, non-linguistic epiphany, the 
‘ultimate real’, is an ‘essential object which isn’t an object any longer, but…something faced 
with which all words cease and all categories fail’.3 To Lacan, the flash of truth regarding the 
self  is made feasible by the dream state’s ‘alleviation of […] imaginary relations’, and as a 
result, the ‘masked’ ‘mirror image’ of the subject, a truth regarding the constructed self which 
is hidden under layers of imaginary workings, is in a single moment exposed; the effect is as if 
the subject is ‘torn apart’, and ‘his isolation in relation to the world has been attained’ (Lacan, 
‘Dream of Irma’s injection’, p. 167). There is a remarkable relation between this description 
and the moment of confrontation with the animal other as described by Derrida; a truth is 
 
3 Jacques Lacan, ‘The dream of Irma’s injection (conclusion)’, in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The 
Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955, trans. by Sylvana Tomaselli (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp. 161–75 (p. 164). Further references to this edition are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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revealed in a blinding, indescribable flash, man is confronted with the edge of symbolic and 
imaginary comprehension. In the case of Lacan, however, the moment comes internally, from 
within the environment of the dream-state, whilst Derrida’s example is triggered externally, a 
sublime moment of self-realisation triggered by the gaze of the animal other.  
Through these explored similarities we can detect a key factor which Lacan may readily 
admit: that which causes brief exposure to the real (or sublime) must originally stem from 
something outside of the symbolic or imaginary, even the highest intellectual comprehension. 
In dreams constructed within the psyche, Lacan describes moments of exposure to the real 
which are unfeasible and symbolically amorphic, yet which are in turn interpreted and accepted 
as such, an acceptance which can appear from a myriad of different directions within the 
symbolic realm but always represents the same thing. Of course, these flashes of 
incomprehensibility necessarily effect our internal workings within the comprehensible realms 
(those not of the real), but in order for it to remind us of our plasticity it must first remind us 
of our beings as grounded, not in the imaginary-constructed lofty heavens of deities but in the 
disregarded dirt and vegetation of earth, rid of ideological constrictions. Hence, the abyss of 
the real isn’t hidden in the heavens but our bodies, and in relation to the world they’re in. This 
idea can be aided by Nietzsche’s early text The Birth of Tragedy, in which we see a duality 
between the Apollinian focus on ‘the beautiful illusion of dream worlds’4 (that which is 
ideological, intellectually heightened but necessarily, and perhaps even more directly than 
normal conscious thought, tied to the symbolic and imaginary) and the ‘primitive…self-
forgetfulness’ of Dionysian music and revelry, in which ‘the union between man and man [is] 
reaffirmed’ (Nietzsche, ‘Birth of Tragedy’, pp. 36–7). This drunken, musical festivity, this 
thoughtless exposure to the real through an utter ignorance of the symbolic and in turn the 
 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and ed. by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 2000) pp. 1–145 (p. 34). Further references to this edition are given 
after quotations in the text. 
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imaginary, is felt entirely by the body and in turn is primordial, or earthly, but is transcendent 
of any ideological barriers constructed by the repressive inner realms. The self in this example, 
therefore, has proven an artistic, bodily access to the real through music and revelry. We can 
observe such ideas later on in the text, wherein Nietzsche argues that ‘music in its absolute 
sovereignty does not need the image and the concept’ whilst other art forms, such as ‘lyric 
poetry’, do (Nietzsche, ‘Birth of Tragedy’, p. 55). The Dionysian concept of music works 
outside the realms of the symbolic and thus imaginary, then, and works as something felt by 
the body in extreme intensities of emotion.  
We can then go further in tying this overcoming of the ideologically created self with 
Nietzsche’s later theory of will to power, his ‘secret’ to ‘life’ which is described in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra as ‘that which must overcome itself again and again’.5 This will is a binding force 
between all living things, a clear example of a bridge between the animal other and human 
perception. We necessarily need this bridge for Derrida’s confrontation to occur, as that which 
is the other must be in some way comprehensible, in some way empathetically reachable, 
despite being so far distant from us. Here we can explore Nietzsche’s further utilisation of the 
body as quintessential in his writings, how we are ‘the body entirely, and nothing beside; and 
soul is only a word for something in the body’ (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 61). We 
can thus observe a link between celebration of the body as a means of truth in a manner that 
works in hand with the Dionysian man, a rejection of the heavenly (or imagistic) soul as 
anything transcendent, but grounded in the body, in the earth. When Derrida encounters the 
experience of the real under the gaze of the animal other he feels an overwhelming feeling of 
plasticity as ideological barriers are broken, the moment is felt through the body rather than 
symbolically analysed through the intellect, the catalyst of the real is experienced externally 
 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Penguin, 2003) pp. 61–163 (p. 138). Further references 
to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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(just as with the music of the Dionysian) and we see proven—in this overwhelming, sensuous 
flash of truth—Nietzsche’s argument that ‘[t]here is more reason in your body than in your 
best wisdom’ (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 62). 
So, to reduce Nietzsche’s terminology where possible, Dionysian revelry and music 
can act as a gateway for us to catch glimpses of the real, through bodily, not intellectual, 
experience. To Lacan, dreams can offer these gateways, and to Derrida (in the specific text 
studied) the gaze of the animal other is one, too. Yet these examples, though coming from the 
last hundred and fifty years, only rephrase ideas which have been circulating about the human 
psyche for thousands; perhaps, they needed re-emergence in the west after the idealisation of 
man became the pinnacle of its Renaissance movement (Not only this, but Christianity has 
always celebrated the superiority of man and dismissed animals as minor insignificances, at 
best products—and thus examples—of God’s power). The close involvement of man to 
animals and earth is prevalent in many religions and practises from throughout history across 
the globe, noted in examples of gods with the ability to transform into animals, or the 
potentiality for man himself to become one, too.  
A prime historical example of utilising bodily transformation is Greek mythology, 
which commonly describes gods morphing into animals in order to carry out their (typically 
sexually oriented) plans, ‘[Demeter, who had transformed into a mare to hide from gods and 
titans] did not…deceive Poseidon, who transformed himself into a stallion and covered her, 
from which outrageous union sprang the nymph Despoena […]’.6 Humans can also be subject 
to this zoomorphism: ‘[…] distraught with grief, [Alcyone] leapt into the sea. Some pitying 
god transformed them both [her and Ceyx] into kingfishers’ (Graves, p. 309). The former 
example implies a great power behind the unknown of the animal other, not just through the 
 
6 Robert Graves, The Greek Myths: The Complete and Definitive Edition (London: Penguin, 2017), p. 120. 
Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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direct implications of a god being present in the shape of an animal, but also of the potentiality 
for any animal to be so. This aids in our argument of the animal other as a form of mysterious 
externality to the human and their constructed self, one which can expose to us in a wondrous 
flash (just as Zeus descended upon Danaë in a shower of gold); a brief exposure to the sublime, 
to the truth (symbolically metaphorical as it is in mythology), a feeling that can only be 
sensuously experienced rather than symbolically, which is perhaps why these transformations 
often lead to sexual encounters. In regard to the latter of the two transformations, the concept 
is more direct, with implications that the self is fluctuating and variable, susceptible to 
manipulation via the real (in this case represented by the ‘pitying god’). The animal other, 
although being everything discussed in the former exploration, is close to us in our grounded 
reality, capable of being reached through zoological bridges between species (just Nietzsche’s 
will to power bonds humans to all living entities).  
We can also locate several religions which relate man closer to the status of nature in 
general, with exemplars including Paganism or, as will be studied here, Shinto. Described by 
Kuroda Toshio as ‘an indigenous self-consciousness’, this elusive Japanese religion worships 
a binding spirit, Kami, which is directly associated—or seen as one—with nature and is a 
driving force of the universe.7 A driving, connective universal force already brings to mind 
Nietzsche’s will to power, however Toshio’s analysis of the religion (alongside ‘including 
nature worship and taboos against [impurities]’) as having ‘no system of doctrine’, and existing 
‘in diverse forms as folk belief but at the same time possess[ing] certain features of organised 
religion’, certainly opens up conversation regarding spiritual views of the self (Toshio and 
others, p. 1). This discussion of Shinto as vaguer than an unequivocal religion—those which 
have concrete mythologies and doctrines—and more as a ‘self-consciousness’ defined by 
 
7 Kuroda Toshio and others, ‘Shinto in the History of Japanese Religion’, in Journal of Japanese Studies, 7 
(1981), 1–21 (p. 3). Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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‘practises’ rather than study, immediately implicates it as a state of mind and thus of self-
identification. Immersing oneself within the physical world and the beauty and power of nature 
(or, more specifically, a world which is a culmination of both physical and meta-physical, with 
worship of holy powers and metaphysical objectivity as detected within, or at one with, the 
physical universe, in a manner quite similar to Taoism), is a powerful method of reaching 
sublime realisations regarding the self, something that the British Romantics of the 1800s were 
so fixated upon. Rather than using the specific feature of the animal other, however—and thus 
unlike the examples within Greek mythology—this method of self-realisation is rooted in a 
grander sense of man in relation to the universe in general; more closely, then, to Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian man. 
In regard to the self, all of these examples prove a means by which its ideological 
constructions can be overcome. Framed in Lacan’s triality of the imaginary, symbolic and real, 
this essay has explored these methods of truth-hunting regarding the self, and how different 
thought-processes or approaches have led to the same goal. Whether through dreams, the 
animal other, Dionysian revelry combined with will to power or celebrations of the natural 
sublime, the end-goal of finding gateways to the real concerning self-identity have been 
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